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Anti-Trust and Economic Theory: 
Some Observations from the US 
Experience 
G.A. HAY* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent developments in US anti-trust can be characterised as reflecting the 
uneasy interaction of two quite separate phenomena: first, the increased 
emphasis on economic analysis as the overriding organising principle of anti- 
trust policy and on economic efficiency as the primary (perhaps only) 
relevant goal for anti-trust; second, the long-standing reluctance of the 
federal judiciary to involve itself in any substantive economic analysis, and 
the preference, instead, for simple rules of thumb or ‘pigeon holes’ to sort 
out lawful from unlawful conduct.’ The result has been that while economics 
has played a major role, it has not influenced American anti-trust as 
thoroughly or as uniformly as might have been imagined; rather the extent 
and the nature of its influence have depended on the degree to which the 
relevant economics could be reduced to the kind of simple rules or pigeon 
holes that the judiciary favours. The present paper will illustrate that theme, 
first by reporting on the two developments separately and then by illustrating 
their joint influence with reference to two important areas of American anti- 
trust: predatory conduct and so-called vertical restraints. Finally, a contrast 
will be made between judicial development in those two areas and recent 
American merger policy which, it is argued, is carried out largely 
independently of the judiciary, and hence the opportunities for economics to 
influence the process are less inhibited by the judicial reluctance to undertake 
extensive economic analysis. 
*George Hay is Professor of Law and Economics at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York and is 
currently a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College, Oxford. 
I This theme is developed in greater detail in Hay (1984). 
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11. THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC THEORY 
The current emphasis by the Reagan administration on economic efficiency 
as the primary goal of anti-trust policy is by now well known. William 
Baxter, Reagan’s first appointee to head the Justice Department’s Antitrust 
Division, was outspoken on the subject, both in his former career as a 
Stanford University Law Professor and during his three year tenure as head 
of the Antitrust Division. But while the emphasis on economics clearly 
reached new heights under the Reagan administration, the trend dates at least 
to the mid-l960s, when Donald Turner, both a lawyer and a PhD in 
economics, headed the Division. 
Two factors can be identified that have caused the trend to accelerate in 
recent years. First is the increasing literacy of American law graduates in 
economics. For reasons having little to do with anti-trust, economics became 
an increasingly popular major among American college students during the 
1960s and 70s. Since law school in America follows the undergraduate 
degree, growing numbers of American students came to law school with 
extensive prior education in economics. Moreover, most major law schools 
were in the process of adding one or more economists to their faculties, 
thereby providing further opportunity for students to become firmly 
grounded in economics. With a larger number of lawyers feeling comfortable 
with economics, the resistance to incorporating economic ideas into legal 
analyses diminished. 
A parallel phenomenon was the increased interest on the part of American 
economists in policy questions relating to anti-trust law. For reasons partly of 
intellectual curiosity and partly related to the money that could be earned 
from offering ‘expert’ advice and testimony in anti-trust cases, excellently 
trained economists drifted from other branches of economics to industrial 
organisation (the branch of economics most closely related to anti-trust), 
Equally importantly, the economists began to publish in law journals, 
converting the formidable mathematical language of economic theory into 
something approaching intelligible English. (There were still some diagrams, 
but the increased training of lawyers in economics made that less of a 
problem than it would have been twenty years before.) 
111. ECONOMlCS AND THE JUDICIARY 
In light of the above developments, it might seem that the way would be 
cleared for the complete take-over of American anti-trust by economic 
theory. But a second factor was operating which would serve both to retard 
the influence of economics to some extent, and, more importantly, to 
channel it in particular directions, not all of which the economic theorists 
would unanimously approve. To understand these developments more fully, 
however, a bit of background is required. 
American anti-trust is conducted primarily in what can be called the 
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judicial mode. That is, as a general rule, anti-trust activity gets underway 
when a plaintiff files a lawsuit against a defendant. The suit is tried before a 
federal district judge and, with increasing frequency, a lay jury. The judge is 
not a specialist in anti-trust matters; indeed he or she may see an anti-trust 
case quite infrequently (depending on the district) sandwiched in among drug 
smuggling, bank robbery, and kidnapping cases. The jury is even less likely to 
be knowledgeable about economics or anti-trust , with university education 
the exception rather than the norm. 
Anti-trust defendants are typically business corporations, but trade 
associations (e.g. The New York Stock Exchange), professional organisations 
(e.g. The American Medical Association), educational associations (e.g. The 
National Collegiate Athletic Association), non-commercial entities (e.g. The 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), and even 
cities (e.g. Boulder, Colorado), have been cast in the role of anti-trust 
defendant. 
The plaintiff in an American anti-trust case may be the Federal 
Government (both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission have jurisdiction to enforce the anti-trust laws; Congress, which 
believed in competition in the market place, also advocated competition to 
enforce the anti-trust laws) or a state government suing on behalf of injured 
consumers within the state. But by far the overwhelming number of anti-trust 
cases are filed either by individual competitors (e.g. a doctor who is denied 
hospital operating privileges) or business entities. 
The numerosity and nature of non-governmental plaintiffs is important 
(the Federal Government is typically a plaintiff in less than 10 per cent of 
cases filed in Federal Court during a given year), since it suggests that the 
attitude of the Justice Department, however strongly committed to economic 
analysis as the organising principle of anti-trust and to economic efficiency as 
the goal, has at best only an indirect influence on the bulk of anti-trust 
activity. Private plaintiffs need be motivated by nothing more than financial 
gain, and the judiciary is under no obligation, in the absence of new 
legislation, to mimic the enforcement philosophy of a particular 
administration. 
Indeed, a dominant characteristic of the Federal Judiciary, in the ninety- 
five years since the passage of the Sherman Act, has been a pronounced 
reluctance to undertake any kind of substantive economic analysis in anti- 
trust cases, preferring to decide cases with simple rules of thumb that enable 
judges to categorise behaviour as lawful or unlawful. This theme was 
sounded in the first substantive case to reach the Supreme Court in an anti- 
trust matter, United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association 166 US 290 
(1897), where the Court refused to consider a defence argument that the 
prices fixed by the cartel were no more than a reasonable level and that, in 
any event, the higher prices were necessary for the long-term survival of the 
railroad industry. The Court asserted its lack of expertise to consider such 
questions, holding that any price fixing agreement was unlawful under the 
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statute. Eventually, this mentality was crystallised in the per se rule for price 
fixing. 
The per se rule for price fixing is, however, merely the most obvious 
illustration of the judiciary’s preference for simple rules of thumb and its 
aversion to substantive economic analysis. Per se rules have governed other 
areas as well, such as tie-ins and group boycotts,2 and even where no per se 
rule applies, such as in merger cases, similarly simple rules (e.g. based on 
market shares) are utilised. 
IV. THE ASYMMETRICAL ADOPTION OF ECONOMIC THEORY 
Surprisingly, the result of the judicial aversion to doing substantive economic 
analysis is not that the courts always resist arguments based on economics. 
Rather, the judicial response to the call for increased reliance on economic 
analysis will depend critically on the nature of the analysis required. Courts 
will incorporate the teachings of economic theory where those teachings can 
be transformed into pigeon holes or simple rules. Where the relevant 
economic advice would require the judge to perform economic analysis, 
however, that advice is likely to be ignored. This point can be illustrated by 
reference to two areas of recent activity in American anti-trust - the law on 
monopolisation, especially with regard to so-ca!led predatory pricing, and the 
law on vertical restraints, especially vertical price fixing or resale price 
maintenance. 
I .  Predatory Pricing and Monopolisation 
Going into 1975 the American case-law on monopolisation was in an 
unsatisfactory state. Courts seemed torn between the desire to find a firm 
which enjoyed a dominant position guilty per se of monopolisation, and the 
perceived need to point to some specific conduct that could be labelled 
‘culpable’ before unlawful monopolisation could be found. The unhappy 
result seemed to be that virtually any action taken by a large firm to maintain 
or increase its market share was labelled ‘exclusionary conduct’ and satisfied 
the behavioural requirement for unlawful monopoly. This meant that once a 
firm achieved a significant market share, almost nothing (short of rapidly 
yielding the monopoly position) could be done to avoid a Sherman Act 
violation. Included in the category of condemned conduct were price cuts, 
since such cuts, when undertaken by a dominant firm, were likely to facilitate 
the continuation of that dominance (at least in the sense of maintaining a 
high market share), even if the price cuts were the quite natural business 
There are established exceptions to the perse rule in some circumstances, e.g. for certain self-regulation 
activities by professional organisations such as the American Medical Association, but until quite recently 
the rule was sufficiently well entrenched to permit the generalisation made in this article. For a discussion 
of how the per se rule has been applied with less rigidity in the past year or two, see Easterbrook (1984). 
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reaction to the low prices of a new entrant or a heretofore unaggressive rival. 
‘Predatory pricing’ was the label given to such price cuts by the dominant 
firm and it was a label that meant almost certain conviction. 
While the case-law could be criticised by economists as destroying the 
incentive for firms that had achieved a large share by producing good 
products and offering them to consumers at low prices to continue this 
seemingly desirable conduct, arguably the result could be tolerated so long as 
it was confined to the occasional industry giant, since a case could be made 
that the economy would be well served by dissolving the monopolist’s power 
regardless of how it had behaved. In addition the Justice Department could 
be counted on to use its prosecutorial discretion to avoid attacking the truly 
benificent large firm. 
However, by the mid-l970s, the Justice Department had no monopoly on 
anti-monopoly cases. Increasingly, the plaintiff in a Sherman Act case was 
not the government, but a competitor of the large firm, and prosecutorial 
discretion was replaced by the motto ‘Sue first - analyse later’, in the hope 
that, regardless of the merits of the case, the large firm could be induced to 
make a substantial financial settlement to avoid the risk of an adverse 
judgement (which carried with it mandatory treble damages). Moreover, the 
defendants were no longer only the well-known industrial giants, but 
virtually any firm that had achieved a strong position, even in a ‘market’ that 
was narrowly defined and small by absolute standards. In short, monopoly 
litigation was out of control. Courts were swamped with cases, often against 
small defendants accused of charging low prices. It would no longer do to 
find all such firms guilty of monopolisation, yet the case-law seemed to offer 
no principled way of sorting out the good from the bad. 
Then in 1975 Harvard Law Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner 
published a law review article3 in which they proposed a remarkably simple (it 
seemed at the time) solution to the predatory pricing morass. Price cuts by a 
dominant firm would be presumed lawful so long as the resulting price level 
exceeded the firm’s incremental costs of production. This would be true 
without regard to the impact of the price cuts on the market share of the 
dominant firm or on the viability of smaller rivals. Moreover, internal 
memoranda suggesting that certain employees of the dominant firm desired 
to kill off its rivals would do nothing to alter the presumption of legality, thus 
saving the court from having to interpret the corporate ‘intent’ from dozens 
of such memoranda. 
The approach taken in the article conformed perfectly with the court’s 
preference for simple rules of thumb. Other than defining the market and 
measuring market share, the only issue was whether price was below cost. 
Moreover, since the latter condition would rarely be satisfied, cases could 
Areeda and Turner (1975). 
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often be disposed of without conclusions on either relevant market or market 
share. 
The impact of the article was rapid and dramatic. Within months, the 
article was being cited as support for dismissing cases and, over the several 
years following, defendants were successful in the overwhelming number of 
decisions that cited the a r t i ~ l e . ~  Indeed, frequently cases were disposed of 
solely on the pleadings. The present article does not necessarily argue that the 
development was a desirable one, or that the economic analysis that underlay 
the Areeda-Turner rules was correct. (I come back to that point a bit later.) 
The episode is notable because it represents a circumstance in which the 
courts responded rapidly and enthusiastically to the advice of economists. 
Economics was influential because the relevant advice, rightly or wrongly, 
could be compressed into simple rules of t h ~ r n b . ~  
2. Vertical Restraints 
As in the case of predatory pricing, the pre-1975 case-law on vertical 
restraints6 was the subject of extensive discussion and criticism from 
economists.’ Yet the literature, while acknowledged by courts in opinions on 
the subject, was not nearly so successful in influencing the development of 
the case-law. 
No doubt, many factors can be cited that may have contributed to the 
result, but at least two are consistent with the theme of this article. First, the 
existing law was relatively simple. Based on the alleged common law 
prohibition of restraint on alienation, the law, with few exceptions,* held all 
vertical restraints unlawful per se. Surely nothing could be more convenient 
from the perspective of a judiciary averse to conducting extensive economic 
analysis. 
Second, the specific advice explicit or implicit in the economics literature 
on vertical restraints seemed not readily amenable to simple rules. 
Economists had theorised that a manufacturer might need to restrict price 
competition among its retail dealers in order to induce dealers to undertake 
costly promotional activities that would substantially increase the overall 
demand for the product. (Even though the retail price might be higher as a 
See Hurwitz and Kovacic (1982). 
An important additional factor at work was the absence of any alternative simple rules. 
For a detailed discussion of the history of vertical restraints in the American courts, see Hay (1985). 
’ The criticism dates at least to 1960. See Telser (1960). 
Situations where the goods were given to the retailer under a consignment arrangement were treated 
more favourably. In addition, a manufacturer could choose unilaterally not to deal with certain retailers 
(e.g. price cutters), so long as no agreement could be implied between the manufacturer and dealers that 
followed the manufacturer’s wishes. See Hay (1985). 
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result, the positive demand-generating effect of this promotional activity 
would more than offset the reduction in sales from the higher retail prices.) 
Hence vertical restraints could actually improve the attractiveness of the 
product in the minds of consumers and thereby could be said to improve 
competition among manufacturers even though it restricted competition 
among retailers of the individual manufacturer. 
Unfortunately, the literature, while demonstrating that vertical restraints 
could improve competition and promote economic efficiency, did not, with 
few exceptions, argue that improved efficiency was the only possible result. 
For example, vertical restraints might reduce competition if they facilitated 
collusion among competing manufacturers. The courts were given no clear 
guidelines on when vertical restraints would turn out to improve consumers' 
welfare, and when they would worsen it. Thus, if the courts were to take 
economic advice seriously, they apparently would be required to ascertain the 
net impact of the vertical restraint in each instance, necessitating the kind of 
extensive economic analysis they were reluctant to undertake. 
The result, not surprisingly, was that courts ignored the economics 
literature entirely for a time and, even when the literature began to be cited, 
the analysis was either disregarded when it came to fashioning the rules or 
used to justify distinctions that did not flow logically from the relevant 
economic analysis. Thus, at present, the law distinguishes outright price 
restraints, i.e. resale price maintenance, from non-price restraints, such as 
allocating exclusive territories among retail  distributor^.^ Such distinctions 
have the nice pigeon hole character that courts prefer, but would not find 
support in much of the relevant economics literature, including that cited by 
the courts. As a consequence of the disparate treatment given the two kinds 
of restraints, litigation focuses not on the competitive impact but instead on 
the distinction, with plaintiff attempting to characterise facially non-price 
restraints as in fact price restraints.'O 
Overall, then, economic theory would be judged less influential in affecting 
the development of the case-law on vertical restraints. For a time the 
economics literature was ignored entirely, and then cited in support of rules 
that did not flow logically from the economists' analyses. A primary reason 
for this result was, in my opinion, the fact that the relevant economics placed 
too much of a burden on the courts to sort out good restraints from bad. 
Until the economic advice can be compressed (perhaps with some acceptable 
The former is illegal per se. The latter is subject to rule of reason analysis since the decision in GTE 
Sylvuniu Inc v Continental TV fnc 433 US 36 (1977). The opinion in Sylvuniu gave lower courts no clear 
guidance about how a rule of reason inquiry should be undertaken. As a consequence, most non-price 
restraints have been upheld. 
l o  This was a main issue in the recent case Monsunto Co v Spray-Rite Service Corp 104 S.Ct. 1464 (1984). 
In its opinion, the Court acknowledged the difficulty of distinguishing price and non-price restraints, but 
insisted that lower courts continue to make the distinction. 
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level of distortion) into simple rules of thumb or pigeon holes" it is not likely 
to dominate the judicial analysis in the way the literature on predatory pricing 
succeeded in doing. 
To summarise the argument thus far, it is not necessarily the case that 
courts will resist the teachings of economists in formulating decisions on anti- 
trust cases. However, economics is likely to be influential only if it can be 
compressed into relatively simple rules of thumb. More complex economic 
analysis is likely to be ignored entirely or to be so distorted in its adaptation 
to legal rules that the results may be no better than had economics been left 
out of the picture entirely. 
3. Merger Policy 
The point can be illustrated further with reference to merger policy in the 
United States. As in the case of predatory pricing, economists have had a 
dramatic impact, but, unlike predatory pricing, the relevant economics is not 
simple and does not take the form of simple yes or no rules. The 1984 
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines require very sophisticated 
quantitative judgements in the process of defining relevant product and 
geographic markets and in attributing to firms some measure of market 
strength. I *  In addition, the possible negative effects from increased 
concentration in a properly defined market are to be weighed against possible 
efficiencies that might be gained from the merger in order to determine the 
net impact on economic efficiency. 
Yet despite these complexities, the relevant economics achieved virtually 
instantaneous implementati~n.'~ The reason, as suggested by the label 
'Department of Justice Guidelines', is that, as a practical matter, merger 
policy in the United States is not carried out in the judicial mode. All mergers 
of consequence must be notified in advance to the Justice DepartmentI4 and 
if the Department elects to challenge the merger in court and so notifies the 
parties concerned, nine times out of ten the contemplated merger will be 
abandoned. Perhaps equally importantly, all the possible mergers that are 
seen by the potential parties to the merger to be in clear violation of the 
' I  A possible candidate for a workable rule would focus on market share and immunise all vertical 
restraints (price and non-price) for firms with shares small enough to make it unlikely that they enjoy any 
significant market power. 
I 2  For a description of how the Guidelines work, see Hay and Reynolds (1985). 
I 3  The Guidelines were initially issued in 1982, and implemented immediately. The 1984 Guidelines reflect 
fairly modest revisions of the 1982 version. 
'' The Federal Trade Commission has concurrent jurisdiction over mergers and receives the same 
notification. The FTC has not issued any detailed guidelines, but its announced enforcement policy does 
not suggest strong differences in the way it would analyse mergers, and in the two years since the 1982 
Guidelines, few operative differences have been observed. 
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Guidelines will not even reach the stage of notification, but will be 
abandoned at the planning stage. Thus, for all intents and purposes, merger 
policy is made not in the adversarial atmosphere of the courtroom, but 
unilaterally by the Justice Department in announcing in advance what 
mergers it will attempt to block. Hence, even though the relevant economic 
analysis is complex, complexity has not been a bar to rapid implementation. 
The Justice Department has a large staff of highly trained economists serving 
alongside lawyers who by now have considerable sophistication themselves in 
the use of economics. The relevant advice need not be compressed into simple 
rules. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
A possible conclusion from this contrast between merger policy and both 
predatory pricing and vertical restraints is that, at least where the relevant 
economic analysis is likely to be complex and not easily compressed into 
simple rules, policy is best made outside the judicial arena, perhaps, as in the 
case of US merger policy, by an executive agency acting unilaterally or, as, 
for example, in the case of the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission, by 
an expert body operating in an administrative or quasi-administrative fashion 
(depending upon the extent of adversarial input, e.g. cross-examination of 
expert witnesses, that will be permitted). Indeed, it might be concluded that 
general-purpose courts should play no role at all in anti-trust, since, even 
where the relevant economics could be compressed into simple rules, the 
expert agency could accomplish the same result, perhaps more rapidly, and 
with less opportunity for confusion. 
However, the same examples used in this paper to support the argument 
that courts are not the ideal forum for incorporating sophisticated economic 
analysis can be used to illustrate that removal of anti-trust altogether from 
the judicial mode carries with it certain risks that may warrant serious 
consideration. It will be recalled that, in relating the rapid adoption by the 
courts of the Areeda-Turner rule on predatory pricing, I did not indicate 
agreement with the Areeda-Turner analysis or approval of the resulting rules. 
As it turned out many commentators did not agree with their analysis and in 
the wake of the publication of their article, a virtual tidal wave of literature 
emerged, criticising the Areeda-Turner analysis, condemning the proposed 
rules, and offering alternatives. In addition, as courts attempted to 
implement the rule in various factual circumstances, other defects or at least 
ambiguities were noted.” 
Since the Supreme Court had not yet blessed the Areeda-Turner analysis, 
there was ample opportunity for a kind of judicial experimentation with 
For a discussion of these developments, see Brodley and Hay (1981). 
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predatory pricing rules as individual courts in dozens of subsequent cases 
could react both to earlier courts’ efforts to apply the rules and to literature 
that emerged in the interim. As a result, while the original economic analysis 
has not been abandoned - indeed it is still at the core of most judicial 
opinions - there has been an evolution of the original rule into a number of 
sophisticated variants that attempt to correct for the perceived deficiencies in 
the original. Interestingly, despite the passing of ten years time, the Supreme 
Court has not yet accepted certiorari in (i.e. agreed to review) a predatory 
pricing case. Perhaps this is merely chance, but one is tempted to ask if it is a 
deliberate strategy undertaken in order to benefit from the ongoing period of 
experimentation. When the Court ultimately takes a case, it will have the 
benefit of dozens of learned articles and perhaps as many as a hundred 
district and appellate court opinions as a base to work from. There is at least 
a hope that the analysis and the rules that subsequently emerge will reflect 
this opportunity for learning. 
In contrast, the Merger Guidelines do not permit the same degree of 
experimentation. For one thing, if the analytical underpinnings of the Justice 
Department procedures are reflective of a particular political or economic 
philosophy that is not universally well regarded, that underlying philosophy 
is likely to be impervious to academic criticism. Moreover, virtually all 
relevant decisions are made in one place, and while the Justice Department 
may elect unilaterally to alter its analysis in the wake of unsatisfactory efforts 
to apply the Guidelines to previously unanticipated fact patterns or to react to 
economic commentary,I6 there is still less opportunity for experimentation 
than where there are hundreds of different decision makers, as in the Federal 
Judiciary - 
I wish to emphasise, however, that the comments about the Guidelines are 
meant to reflect the potential for problems in this kind of decision mode, not 
any actual dissatisfaction with the present Guidelines. Nor do I wish to 
minimise the inefficiency that has resulted from US courts’ clumsy and 
erratic efforts to incorporate economics into the decision process. The point 
is simply that where policy rests on an analytic base that does not reflect 
consensus or, like any science, is continually evolving (often quite rapidly), 
the judicial mode provides an opportunity for distillation, adjustment, and, 
if necessary, reversal of previously well-established positions in the light of 
new evidence, and for a diversity of decision making until consensus is 
achieved. This is a factor that ought to be given some weight in decisions as to 
how best to structure the decision making framework of competition policy. 
I b  As indicated above, the 1982 Guidelines were revised after two years experience. 
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